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Abstract 
Wondering about “how Darwinian” cultural change actually is, some authors 
have recently stressed that there are different degrees to which a process can 
be considered as evolutionary. Some of them advocate for a central role of 
selective processes in cultural evolution, while others deny that these are 
relevant to explain cultural change, if not incidentally. Taking a cue from this 
debate, in this chapter, I shall discuss a series of theoretical and explanatory 
commitments usually adopted by those that, like cultural evolutionists, aim 
to extend evolutionary theory to non-strictly biological domains. My goal is 
to identify a class of evolutionary factors that, although frequently neglected 
in the debate, may be actually qualified as Darwinian and, consequently, 
argue for a more complete picture of evolutionary change. These factors are 
demographic factors, that is, factors related to the size, density and structure 
of populations. After having described in some detail in which way they differ 
from other causes of evolution, I shall relate the discussion in cultural 
evolutionary theory to a broader debate about the importance of natural 
selection in Darwinian thinking. 
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Practitioners in cultural evolutionary theory usually consider themselves as 
full-fledged Darwinians (e.g. Richerson and Boyd 2005; Mesoudi 2011; 
Henrich 2016). Nonetheless, wondering about “how Darwinian” cultural 
change actually is, Peter Godfrey-Smith (2007, 2009), Tim Lewens 
(2009, 2013, 2015) and Claidière et al. (2014) have recently stressed that 
	 
there are different degrees to which a process can be considered Darwinian. 
Beyond the taxonomic and terminological idiosyncrasies of each author 
(Brusse 2017), all of them agree that there are three main possible Darwinist 
interpretations of cultural change. They are—from the strictest (i.e. cultural 
change is taken to be very similar to biological evolution) to the loosest (i.e. 
cultural change is only vaguely resembling biological evolution)—
the replicator interpretation, the selectionist interpretation and 
the populational one. According to the replicator interpretation, cultural 
change is Darwinian insofar as it involves the propagation of discrete units 
of information analogous to genes, i.e. the memes (Dawkins 1976; 
Dennett 1995, 2017; Blackmore 1999). More modestly, the selectionist 
interpretation assumes that cultures are composed by heterogeneous cultural 
traits or variants (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Richerson and Boyd 2005)—
that is, traditions, skills, beliefs, techniques, knowledge, etc.—which not 
necessarily are similar to genes. Yet, given that (I) there is variation between 
cultural variants, (II) they are relatively faithfully transmitted and (III) they 
are differentially adopted in virtue of some of their features, then—following 
a widely accepted conception (Lewontin 1970; Huneman 2015)—it is still 
possible to say that cultural change instantiates a Darwinian process. Finally, 
the populational interpretation denies that these conditions are met—if not 
occasionally—by cultural change and maintains, instead, that cultural 
evolutionary theory is “evolutionary” just because it relies on a certain 
extension of population thinking to the cultural domain. For the authors 
supporting the populational view, it is somehow misleading to consider 
cultural change processes as the effect of selective pressures. 
The question is: to what extent a theory that does not acknowledge a central 
role to selection may be properly considered as “Darwinian”? This is an 
interesting question not just in the context of the debate over cultural 
evolution but, more in general, for evolutionary biology as a whole. In fact, 
throughout the last 50 years or so, many practitioners in the fields of 
molecular evolution (Kimura 1968; King and Jukes 1969), palaeontology 
(Gould 1977) and developmental biology (Pigliucci and Muller 2010) have 
challenged, to a different extent, the prominence of natural selection in 
genetic evolutionary processes (for detailed discussions of this process of 
reconsideration of the role of natural selection in evolutionary biology and 
related fields, see Delisle’s, Granovitch’s, Tattersall’s and Schwartz’ 
contributions to this volume). 
In this chapter, I shall interpret some recent developments within cultural 
evolutionary theory as an example of how an evolutionary theory may be 
considered Darwinian, even though it does not put selection in the 
foreground. To be precise, I consider that cultural evolutionary theory may 
be understood as a Wrightean theory. This is because, in addition to explain 
cultural change by adopting a variational view of populations assimilable to 
	 
Darwin’s one, it also puts emphasis—like the well-known “Shifting-balance 
theory” by Sewall Wright (1948, 1982)—on structural properties of 
populations. To this goal, I shall proceed roughly as follows. First, in Sect. 2, 
I shall discuss, drawing on Lewtonin (1974), the minimal requirements for a 
theory to be considered as “evolutionary”. An evolutionary theory must 
provide, necessarily, a set of laws of transformation and it must be 
dynamically sufficient. I shall thus argue that the disagreement between the 
supporters of the replicator, the selectionist and the populational 
interpretations is a disagreement about what makes cultural evolutionary 
theory dynamically sufficient. I shall discuss the differences between these 
three interpretations in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, I shall attempt to go beyond these 
interpretations, by pointing out that both in evolutionary biology and cultural 
evolutionary theory, practitioners are paying increasingly more attention to 
the causal import of demographic factors of evolution. I shall finally argue, 
in Sect. 5, that the causal role of these factors can be incorporated in a broad 
Darwinian/Wrightian picture of evolution, in which selection, in spite of 
being an important engine of change, is not necessarily the fundamental one. 
 
15.2.  
What Is an Evolutionary Theory? 
In the first chapter of his classic book, The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary 
Change, Richard Lewontin presents those which, in his opinion, are the basic 
requirements for a theory to be considered an evolutionary theory. They are 
very general requirements, and they are likely satisfied also by many theories 
in physics. They should not be intended, thus, as sufficient conditions to 
identify evolutionary theories in biology. Since they are, nonetheless, 
necessary conditions for any theory aimed to account for evolutionary 
changes, they provide a valuable starting point for our discussion. Lewontin 
states that “… the problem of constructing an evolutionary theory is the 
problem of constructing a state space that will be dynamically sufficient, and 
a set of laws of transformation in that state space that will transform all the 
state variables” (1974, p. 8). In other words, the problem of constructing an 
evolutionary theory is the problem of providing a set of laws—or we may 
say, more loosely, a set of models—describing the change of the system under 
study from an instant t to a subsequent instant t’, and a 
suitable causal interpretation of the system, such that the change 
from t to t’ can be ascribed to the material factors which are responsible for 
it. 
Thus, for instance, in the genetic theory of evolution, we have a set of 
equations provided by population genetics—which describe different 
possible transformations in a state space made up of allelic frequencies—that 
	 
correspond to the laws of transformation of the theory. This theory is, 
moreover, dynamically sufficient because it identifies, in genetic inheritance 
and in the differential survival and reproduction of the individuals due to 
environmental circumstances, the factors that are materially responsible for 
the transformations in the state space. This is to say that, at least in principle, 
evolutionary biologists may account for the change in allelic frequencies in a 
specific population by pointing out, with relative precision, the causes of the 
change.1 
Cultural evolutionary theory has received some different mathematical 
formulations, but the models that are considered by most practitioners as 
foundational for this disciplinary field are those put forward by Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985), within the so-
called dual-inheritance theory. These models are an intentional extension of 
population genetics to changing frequencies of cultural traits, or variants. 
Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman, Boyd and Richerson interpret cultural traits as a 
class of phenotypical traits transmitted through a channel of inheritance 
alternative to the genetic one, that is, social learning. The peculiarity of 
cultural transmission by social learning is that information does not flow 
mainly vertically (from parents to offspring generation), like in genetic 
inheritance, but also horizontally (among the members of the same 
generation), obliquely (from members of the parental generation to members 
of the offspring generation who are not genetically related to the former) and 
even from the offspring to the parental generation. Moreover, while the 
genetic system of inheritance usually determines a fixed number of ancestors 
for each descendant, social learning allows some individuals to have a 
variable number of ancestors. Some individuals adopt a cultural trait after 
having learned it from different and multiple ancestors. Finally, while genetic 
inheritance is “discontinuous” (in the sense that an allele is either transmitted 
to the descendant or not), cultural influence comes in degree (that is, a 
cultural variant can be just partially transmitted). 
The change in the distribution of cultural variants in a population from a 
generation (taken using any arbitrary time interval) to another is, according 
to this rather standard picture of cultural evolutionary theory, due to both 
“purely biological” factors (such as selection, migration, drift, etc.—after all, 
cultural variants are phenotypic traits and, as such, are subject to all these 
evolutionary forces) and other “properly cultural” factors. These have been 
conceptualised in a variety of ways. Boyd and Richerson (1985; see also 
Richerson and Boyd 2005), for instance, talk about distinct kinds of social 
learning biases, which would modify the frequencies of cultural variants 
depending on the fact that some of them are cognitively more attractive (or 
more easily memorisable) than others, or are already adopted by prestigious 
members of the population or by some specific group. Some authors (e.g. 
Durham 1991; Mesoudi 2011) have suggested to characterise the process 
	 
resulting from the repeated and large-scale action of social learning biases 
as cultural selection.2 As we shall see in Sect. 3, other authors consider that 
this conceptualisation of social learning biases is inaccurate (e.g. Sperber and 
Claidière 2008; Claidière et al. 2014). 
To better understand this criticism we must first, however, consider a 
preliminary issue. Although all the differences between genetic inheritance 
and cultural transmission, as well as the effects of the factors producing 
cultural change, can be, at least in principle, properly formalised (see, for 
instance, besides the already mentioned Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; 
Boyd and Richerson 1985, also Henrich 2001; Henrich and Boyd 2002; El 
Mouden et al. 2014; Aguilar and Akçay 2018), this is not a guarantee that 
cultural evolutionary theory is dynamically sufficient. It could be the case, in 
fact, that we are able to determine the laws of transformation of an 
evolutionary phenomenon without being able to identify what are, in specific 
circumstances, the material processes responsible for a certain evolutionary 
outcome.3 In particular, in the case of cultural evolution, it has been 
frequently raised the concern that, differently from what occurs with genetic 
inheritance, we do not have a satisfactory understanding of the causal 




Dynamical Sufficiency in Cultural Evolution 
In this section, I shall discuss the three most common interpretations of 
cultural evolutionary theory as a Darwinian theory. In accordance with the 
framework presented in the last section, I will argue that they differ mainly 
because their alternative characterisations of the dynamical features of the 
processes of cultural change. The replicator interpretation (Sect. 3.1) settles 
the problem concerning the dynamical sufficiency of cultural evolutionary 
theory by postulating that the diffusion of cultural traits depends on the 
cultural transmission of discrete entities analogues to genes, also known as 
memes. The selectionist interpretation (Sect. 3.2) avoids such a strong 
analogy between genetic and cultural evolution and grounds the dynamical 
sufficiency of cultural evolutionary theory on the population-level properties 
of the processes of cultural change. Finally, the populational interpretation 
(Sect. 3.3) raises doubts over the correctness of the selectionist interpretation 
and suggests a deflationary perspective about the dynamical properties of 
cultural evolutionary processes per se. Cultural change, according to this 
view, would be epiphenomenal with respect to the myriads of social 
interactions between the members of a population. In the last Sect. 3.4, I shall 




The Replicator Interpretation 
Originally put forward by Richard Dawkins in his best-seller The Selfish 
Gene (Dawkins 1976), and later popularised by Dennett (1995) and 
Blackmore (1999), the so-called memetic theory has, at its core, the thesis 
that the processes of cultural change are carried out by hypothetical entities, 
i.e. the memes—which would replicate analogously to genes. The problem of 
the dynamical sufficiency in cultural evolutionary theory is thus easily solved 
by postulating that cultural evolution works in the same way genetic 
evolution does. Of course, memeticists are aware of the peculiarities of 
cultural transmission with respect to genetic inheritance (see Sect. 2 above), 
as well as of the different paces of cultural evolution and genetic evolution. 
Nevertheless, these are aspects that empirical research is called to elucidate: 
they do not necessarily invalidate the analogy (as a matter of fact, even within 
genetic evolution there are many exceptions to the classical Mendelian and 
gradualist forms of evolution; see, for instance, Schwartz, this volume). 
Naturally, as frequently happens, this apparently easy solution has a high 
price to pay. Although, in fact, it is true that the analogy between genes and 
memes may be fruitful even in case it is not perfect (no analogy is!), the 
burden of proof that the gene is a good model to represent the evolving 
entities in cultural evolution is on memeticists’ side. Memeticists must show 
that the putative dynamics of memes’ replication is consistent with our 
knowledge about how cultural information is transmitted, and they should 
ideally provide some evidence that memes indeed exist and are causally 
efficient. Concerning both issues, however, many difficulties have been 
raised. I shall summarise here just some of them. 
First of all, memeticists are not clear about what entities would exactly count 
as memes. Memes are arguably not identical to cultural variants (beliefs, 
skills, traditions, artefacts, etc.), which are commonly considered as a class 
of phenotypic traits (or, in the case of artefacts, objects carrying information 
potentially influencing phenotypic traits; Odling-Smee et al. 2003). Since 
memes are by definition analogous to genes, they should be rather considered 
as the entities which are responsible for the expression of cultural variants 
(just like genes are the entities which are responsible for the expression of 
non-cultural phenotypic traits). However, this leads to a highly speculative 
picture of the processes of cultural transmission. Differently from what 
occurs in genetic inheritance, it would seem that in cultural transmission the 
phenotypic traits are directly transmitted (Sperber 2001; Lewens 2013). In 
what sense, when we learn a new skill or habit, is there a transmission 
of something else underlying the skill or the habit? And what about the 
	 
developmental processes supposedly involved in the phenotypic expression 
of the “memetype”? 
The analogy with genes, furthermore, commits memeticists to ascribe to 
memes a certain fidelity of transmission. Again, it is perhaps not necessary, 
for the analogy to be tenable, that memetic transmission is as faithful as 
genetic inheritance. Yet, to the extent that memetic transmission is a process 
of replication, it may well be expected that the socially learned information 
is approximatively the same as the one that is transmitted. However, as 
observed by a number of authors (Sperber 2001 is probably the most well-
known; see also Sterelny 2017), social learning of skills, knowledge and 
traditions is not a process of copy-paste, but a far more complex process in 
which information is reformulated according to the subject’s  expectations 
and goals. As evidence of this, notice that it is rarely possible to identify well-
defined lineages of cultural items or traditions (Wimsatt 1999; Lewens 2013; 
Morin 2016). Making exception of some rare cases, most interesting cultural 
traits display a relatively high degree of idiosyncratic variation, which turns 
the memetic hypothesis quite unlikely. 
All these criticisms might perhaps be less pressing if memeticists had been 
able to provide some empirical evidence of the existence of memes or, at 
least, of their explanatory import. Neither in this sense, though, memetics 
seem to have made many steps forward. As some former supporters of 
memetics themselves noticed (Edmonds 2002, 2005), memetics has failed to 
produce substantive results. At most, it can be interpreted as a metaphorical 
(and partial) reformulation of something that can be more fruitfully 




The Selectionist Interpretation 
According to the “orthodox” view in dual-inheritance theory, the processes 
of cultural change and accumulation can be considered as analogous to 
biological evolution even though cultural variants are not analogous to genes 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005). As already mentioned in the introduction, for the 
supporters of the selectionist view, all a process needs in order to be properly 
treated as an evolutionary process is to 
exhibit variation, heritability and variation in fitness. A process satisfying 
these requirements is, in addition, not just an evolutionary process, but 
a Darwinian one (Lewontin 1970; Huneman 2015). 
Before discussing in some detail the selectionist stance concerning the 
problem of dynamical sufficiency, it is important to avoid some possible 
misunderstandings. First of all, we have to distinguish the selectionist view 
from what we may call a “panadaptationist” view of cultural evolution. 
	 
According to a supporter of the selectionist view, cultural evolution might be 
a kind of Darwinian evolution even when selection was not the only factor of 
change. As a matter of fact, dual-inheritance theorists envisage, as possible 
causes of cultural change, a broad set of factors, like drift, migration, directed 
mutation, etc. (Mesoudi 2011; Baravalle 2019), selection thus being just one 
of them. What characterises the selectionist view against other interpretations 
of cultural evolution is, rather, a certain emphasis on the population-level 
properties of the processes of cultural change. 
As we have seen in Sect. 2, individuals in a society transmit cultural 
information through (biased) social learning. Beyond the idiosyncrasies of 
each interaction between the members of the population, it is possible to find 
population patterns of distribution of cultural variants. These patterns reflect 
the overall action of the interactions between individuals in a way that is 
suitably conceptualised through an evolutionary framework. As a matter of 
fact, a society may be profitably conceived as a set of different cultural 
variants (variation), changing in composition through time, for reasons due 
(except when other factors like drift, migration, etc. are in act) to the 
differential capacity of cultural variants to be adopted—in virtue of their 
usefulness, attractiveness or memorability (variation in fitness). 
Of course, this explanation can be interpreted as a merely statistical one. It 
may be said, for instance, that the population-level description of human 
societies in terms of changing distributions of cultural variants is nothing 
more than a useful abstraction (see below, Sect. 3.3). Nonetheless, 
selectionists seem to have a causally stronger interpretation of the 
evolutionary framework. In other words, they are committed to the claim that 
the cultural evolutionary framework is dynamically sufficient. But what does 
it provide the material support of cultural evolution? In a word, heritability. 
The repeated social interactions between the members of a population 
constitute a full-fledged channel of inheritance, alternative to the genetic 
one, and it is precisely the persistence of this inheritance channel what 
guarantees dynamical sufficiency to the cultural evolutionary process. 
We have already discussed the characteristics of social learning as channel of 
inheritance in Sect. 2. The point here is that the selectionist interpretation, 
differently from the replicator interpretation, dismisses the analogy between 
cultural variants and genes, but still claims that cultural transmission is 
faithful enough to be fruitfully compared to genetic inheritance. In spite of 
the many idiosyncrasies of any single episode of transmission of cultural 
information, selectionists argue that there is something (i.e. the cultural 
variant) which is preserved (Henrich and Boyd 2002) and this provides a 
sufficient basis to consider the processes of cultural change as evolutionary 




The Populational Interpretation 
By analysing a famous model in cultural evolutionary theory on the effects 
of conformism in the diffusion of a cultural trait (Henrich and Boyd 1998), 
Lewens (2015) states thatit 
aim[s] to show that individuals who learn in a conformist manner are likely 
to do better than individuals who instead rely on learning from their 
environment, or who learn by imitating a randomly chosen member of the 
population. [Henrich and Boyd’s] model takes account of the effects of 
learning, but not in a way that relies on a notion of Darwinian struggle, or 
selection, going on among cultural traits (Lewens 2015, p. 38). 
After having extended similar considerations to another set of models 
(Henrich and Boyd 2002; on the characteristics of cultural transmission), 
Lewens concludes that “the explanatory pay-off of the evolutionary stance 
derives from the surprising nature of aggregation, made visible by the use of 
mathematical models. In neither case does the pay-off derive from a notion 
of cultural selection” (Lewens 2015, p. 38). 
If the notion of cultural selection is not crucial to cultural evolutionary 
explanations, it is natural to wonder: in what sense are they Darwinian? In 
order to answer this question, Lewens invokes bibliographic evidence, mainly 
drawn from Boyd and Richerson’ writings and, in particular, Richerson and 
Boyd (2005). He observes that: 
in the opening pages of that book, where their basic methodological and 
explanatory assumptions are laid out, they [Richerson and Boyd] affiliate 
their approach to a Darwinian tradition in a manner that does not place 
selection in the foreground, but which instead stresses the importance of 
population thinking (Lewens 2015, p. 16; emphasis in the original). 
Now, in a frequently cited passage, Mayr states that population thinking is 
the claim that 
All organisms and organic phenomena are composed by unique features and 
can be described collectively only in statistical terms. Individuals, or any kind 
of organic entities, form populations of which we can determine the 
arithmetic mean and the statistics of variation. Averages are mere statistical 
abstractions; only the individuals of which the populations are composed 
have reality (1959 [2006], p. 326). 
If we adapt this conception to cultural evolution, we may reasonably think—
Lewens suggests—that, according to cultural evolutionary theory, only the 
individual organisms, endowed by specific psychological biases, are “real”, 
while the properties of the populations, like the distribution of cultural 
variants, are mere statistical abstractions (Lewens 2009, p. 248–9). Cultural 
change, accordingly, would be—like a change in temperature or pressure in 
the kinetic theory of gases—just the aggregate of myriads of individual-level 
interactions: no population-level factors would play a causal role in addition 
to these interactions. Population-level descriptions certainly have an 
	 
invaluable explanatory import, because they allow to bookkeep the otherwise 
epistemically inaccessible contingent circumstances in which individual 
organisms learn and transmit information. Nevertheless, the population-level 
properties that occur in such descriptions are causally inert, mere 
epiphenomena, which are in need to be further explained in terms of 
individual-level interactions. 
This interpretation is also shared by a group of cultural evolutionists 
frequently labelled as cultural epidemiologists (Sperber 1996; Claidière et 
al. 2014; Morin 2016; Scott-Phillips et al. 2018). Besides being critics of 
memetics, they are sceptical about the selectionist interpretation for similar 
reasons: in their opinion, cultural transmission is not faithful enough to be 
properly considered as a channel. During the many interactions between 
individuals in a population, cultural information is continuously 
reformulated. While, a posteriori, it is frequently possible to reconstruct a 
unitary narrative of certain cultural traditions, there is nothing like a cultural 
trait persisting through all the interactions. This may be interpreted as a claim 
that, as evolutionary theory, cultural evolutionary theory is not dynamically 
sufficient. Of course, there is “something underlying” the process of cultural 
change, but cultural change in itself is not a phenomenon admitting an 





As already mentioned in the introduction, my goal in this chapter is to show 
that there is at least another alternative way to interpret a process as 
evolutionary and, more specifically, as Darwinian—besides the ones usually 
considered in the literature. Before proceeding to that, however, I would like 
to pause our discussion and highlight some, in my opinion, important points. 
First of all, I would like to stress that the interpretation of population thinking 
advocated by Lewens and cultural epidemiologists is just one among others 
possible. I argued more extensively for this claim elsewhere 
(Baravalle 2019), but I think it is useful here to shortly return on it. According 
to two champions of dual-inheritance theory, McElreath and Henrich (2007), 
for instance, population thinking does not entail a reduction of population-
level dynamics to individual-level interactions (this would be more 
characteristic of methodological individualism in social sciences) nor a 
reduction of individual-level interactions to population-level dynamics (this 
would be methodologically equivalent to adopting a sort of holism). Instead, 
it entails an interplay between the two levels. Given a certain demic structure, 
individuals interact with neighbours and with the environment, thus 
determining the composition of the population in terms of cultural variants. 
	 
However, the other way around, cultural variants influence, in virtue of their 
distribution and functional properties, the demic structure and, therefore, 
individuals’ behaviours and interactions. A similar conception was indeed 
already defended by Boyd and Richerson (1985, pp. 23–4). 
According to this alternative interpretation of population thinking—which is 
in contrast with the one supported by Lewens and cultural epidemiologists—
in order to explain cultural change it is not enough to decompose the 
phenomenon into its basic elements, but it is also necessary to take into 
account the characteristics of the population as a whole. To provide a 
complete picture of cultural change, populations must be represented as 
“changing distributions of cultural variants”. This is not simply a useful 
description of something that can also be expressed otherwise (i.e. in terms 
of additive individual interactions); it denotes a standalone feature of the 
processes being modelled. 
Even admitting this alternative view of population thinking, which is 
certainly more friendly towards a selectionist interpretation of cultural 
evolutionary processes, the problem of the fidelity of cultural transmission is 
still there. On the one hand, and independently from any specific conception 
of population thinking, a purely populational interpretation of cultural 
change, although perhaps sufficient to characterise cultural evolutionary 
theory as “evolutionary” (in the sense that it provides information about the 
entities carrying the causal weight of the processes under study), is probably 
too weak to make it a “Darwinian” theory. Not just Darwin’s theory, but many 
other theories which we would not consider as properly Darwinian—for 
instance, in epidemiology, sociology or economics—adopt some populational 
view akin to the ones presented in this and the last subsection (see Illari and 
Russo 2014, Chap. 5). 
On the other hand, the issue is that—if we consider the selectionist view as 
the one stating the minimal requirements for a theory to be Darwinian—it is 
not clear that cultural transmission is faithful enough to count as an 
inheritance channel. I think that this problem is prominently empirical. In this 
sense, further research on the nature of the transmission of information in 
social interactions and the social learning processes is certainly needed (and 
it is already ongoing; see, for instance, Kendal et al. 2018). In the remainder 
of this chapter, though, I shall suggest that all this debate is somehow vitiated 
by an unwarranted assumption, that is, that the dynamical sufficiency of 
cultural evolutionary theory entirely (or, at least, mostly) depends on the 




Demographic Factors in Genetic and Cultural 
Evolution 
In Sect. 2, we have seen that the theory of genetic evolution is a full-fledged 
evolutionary theory, in conformity with Lewontin’s characterisation, because 
it supposedly provides a set of transformation laws and a dynamical 
characterisation of the processes under study. This theory is dynamically 
sufficient because it identifies the factors that are materially responsible for 
the transformations in the state space of allelic frequencies: these factors are 
genetic inheritance and the differential survival and reproduction of the 
individuals due to environmental circumstances. The debate over the 
evolutionary interpretation of cultural evolutionary theory discussed in 
Sect. 3 has been almost entirely focused on the putative similarities between 
cultural transmission and genetic inheritance, largely neglecting the 
importance of environmental factors in the dynamical characterisation of 
evolutionary processes. In this section, I shall focus on a type of 
environmental factors that, in my opinion, are especially relevant in the 
causal characterisation of cultural evolution, that is, demographic factors. 
Interestingly, demographic factors have been somewhat neglected also in 
evolutionary biology. For this reason, I shall first, in Sect. 4.1, briefly discuss 
how they have been recently incorporated within traditional models of 
genetic evolution. Then, in Sect. 4.2, I shall argue that they have always 
played a prominent role also in cultural evolutionary models. In Sect. 5, I 
shall finally show how the consideration of demographic factors helps to 
provide a more articulated Darwinian picture of cultural evolutionary theory. 
 
15.4.1.  
Demographic Factors in Genetic Evolution 
Although, as we shall discuss in some detail in Sect. 5, the relevance of 
demographic factors in evolution was already stressed by an architect of the 
Modern Synthesis such as Sewall Wright, it is just in the last 30 years or so 
that their importance in bridging ecological and evolutionary knowledge has 
started to be fully appreciated. As Lowe et al. (2017) notice: 
The rift between longstanding population genetics theory and current eco-
evolutionary research underscores the challenge of fully addressing the forces 
that drive evolution at the population level. This challenge is not new 
([Darwin 1859], p. 64), and is embodied in a historical debate over the power 
of selection to drive evolutionary change in the face of other, non-adaptive 
forces—a debate that is largely settled in the field of evolutionary biology, 
but the root of a narrow view of evolution in many current eco-evolutionary 
studies (Lowe et al. 2017, p. 142). 
In Lowe and his colleagues’ opinion, the study of the demic structure of a 
population is the key to understand the conditions under which selective 
	 
pressures and other evolutionary forces can act, and with which intensity. 
Lowe and colleagues identify three main properties of a population that can 
bias evolutionary dynamics: population size, population density and 
population connectivity. 
Population size is, perhaps, the less surprising one. As a matter of fact, the 
effects of population size on population dynamics has long been noticed, both 
theoretically (Wright 1932) and experimentally (Dobzhansky and 
Pavlovsky 1957). Typically, a reduced population size prevents natural 
selection to act sorting the fittest traits, increases stochastic fluctuations of 
allelic frequencies (i.e. genetic drift) and, ultimately, results in a reduction of 
variation. The other way around, to the extent population size (or, more 
correctly, effective population size; Charlesworth 2009) increases, drift 
effects diminish and natural selection can act undisturbed. 
The effects of population density are more interesting. Population density 
favours processes of soft selection (Wallace 1975). In Lowe et al.’s words: 
Under soft selection, the availability of different niches in the environment 
and competition among genotypes results in adaptive change. There are no 
optimal genotypes, but instead a range of successful genotypes determined 
by the combination of extrinsic forces, density and the frequency of other 
genotypes in the population (Lowe et al. 2017, pp. 142–143; emphasis 
added). 
In other words, soft selection—which, contrarily to “hard” selection, is not 
an eliminative force, but permits the maintenance of a broad range of different 
phenotypes—is a force directly related to demographic factors. We may say 
that population density favours specialisation. The high density of a 
population is generally the effect of the absence of ecological factors causing 
hard selection (like, for instance, predators or the extreme scarcity of 
resources, which yield a high mortality). In such conditions, as Darwin had 
already noted, the “struggle for survival” may acquire less dramatic tones; 
nonetheless, since resources are usually not unlimited, selection can act more 
subtly, by promoting survival strategies that resort to resources not exploited 
by other members of the population.4 
Finally, population connectivity is surely the most complex and heterogenous 
demographic cause of evolution. As a matter of fact, it would be more correct 
to conceive population connectivity as a class of demographic factors, rather 
than a single one. What all these factors have in common is that they depend 
on migration between demes in a structured population. The migration of 
individuals from a deme to another may generate a series of evolutionary 
dynamics, from the promotion or the prevention of adaptive evolution, to 
stochastic fluctuations. Notably, one of the contexts in which the effects of 
migration in a connected population have been most extensively studied is in 
the diffusion of behavioural traits. Animal personality, for instance, has been 
linked to different eco-evo dynamics (Sih et al. 2012). Animals 
	 
with “exploratory” personalities, who are more propense to migrate than 
“shy” ones, can be heavily influential in the behaviour of the individuals 
belonging to the deme which receives them. Populations with a high level of 
connectivity are more subject to this kind of “invasions” than less connected 
ones, and different demic structures may favour or prevent a broad range of 
possible dynamics. 
A common feature of all these demographic factors is that they can act very 
quickly, from an evolutionary point of view, reflecting in almost real-time 
the effects of the ecological circumstances in which the population happens 
to find itself. The demographic factors accelerate complex evolutionary 
dynamics affecting the composition of the population, even when the traits 
undergoing the evolutionary dynamics have not a well-defined genetic basis 
(or it is unknown). 
 
15.4.2.  
Demographic Factors in Cultural Evolution 
All the demographic factors discussed in the previous sub-section have also 
been studied in the context of cultural evolution. 
Concerning the effects of population size, the possibly most well-known case 
is the loss of technology in Tasmania, originally described in cultural 
evolutionary terms by Henrich (2004). About 18,000 years ago, New Guinea 
and Tasmania were a unique land with Australia. When the process of 
insulation started, Tasmanian populations found themselves separated from 
their Australian cousins. This resulted in a drastic reduction of the population 
size of Tasmanian populations. One of the effects of this geological 
transformation was a quick loss of technologies, especially related to fishing, 
in Tasmanian populations. Like in genetic evolution, also in cultural 
evolution population size reduction entails a reduction of variation in the 
population (in the Tasmanian case, the death of fishermen who never taught 
fishing techniques irremediably resulted in the disappearance of such 
techniques). 
Population density and connectivity are both decisive factors, according to 
Lycett and Norton (2010), for the emergence of Palaeolithic technological 
evolution. In their opinion, we can reconstruct three ideal stages of such 
evolution (occurred during different epochs depending on the geographical 
region), roughly corresponding to three distinct “demographic levels”, or 
modes. In the first level, human populations are relatively small, with low 
density and weak interconnectedness. Human populations at this stage exhibit 
little technological variation. The second and the third modes correspond to 
a progressive enlargement of human populations, a greater density and higher 
levels of social interconnectedness. All this contributes to a more diverse 
cultural variation (similar conclusions are attained by Powell et al. 2009). 
	 
These studies do not reveal what kind of cultural variants are favoured by 
population density and connectivity, but just that these are crucial conditions 
for having cultural variation. Nonetheless, other works developed in the 
context of cliodynamics (Turchin 2003, 2008) seem to provide more 
information about frequency-dependent dynamics between specific kinds of 
cultural variants throughout the history of human societies. Cliodynamics is 
a dynamical systems approach applied to human history, which accounts for 
the evolution of a society as the effect of the interaction between many 
subsystems. In order to formulate reliable hypotheses about historical 
phenomena, Turchin and his collaborators elaborate data from Seshat, an 
impressive databank which collects information about the social and political 
organisation of virtually any human group along the history of our species, 
from Neolithic to modern societies (http://seshatdatabank.info). 
Turchin et al. (2018) provide surprising evidence about the predictability of 
many characteristics of complex societies across different world regions. 
These researchers captured information on 51 variables reflecting nine 
characteristics of human societies, such as social scale, economy, features of 
governance and information systems. Even though Cliodynamics adopts an 
approach which is different from the one adopted by dual-inheritance theory, 
we may reasonably consider such variables as classes of cultural variants. 
Turchin et al. found out that some aspects of social organisation are 
functionally connected and, for this reason, the classes of behaviour related 
to them are expected to coevolve in a predictable way. For instance, 
scale variables are likely to be tightly linked, since increases or decreases in 
size may require changes in the degree of hierarchy (both too few and too 
many decision-making levels create organizational problems). A similar 
argument has been put forward for size and governance. The production of 
public goods, such as infrastructure, may require solutions to collective 
action problems, and these can be provided by governance institutions and 
professional officials (Turchin et al. 2018, p. E147). 
The spread of religious, philosophical or scientific beliefs are, as it may be 
expected, correlated with the diffusion of information systems, such as 
alphabet and writing. On the contrary, other classes of variables, like those 
related to money, are just loosely related to the evolution of most other 
variants. However, all these variables are somehow dependent on the 
demographic and organisational features of the societies. 
 
15.5.  
Is this Darwinism? 
All the evidence discussed in the previous section supports, in my view, the 
claim that, even if we eventually discovered that cultural transmission is 
	 
significantly different from genetic inheritance, cultural evolutionary theory 
would keep being to a certain extent dynamically sufficient in virtue of 
demographic factors. Demographic factors seemingly play a crucial role both 
in the emergence and in the evolution of culture. They are what Wimsatt 
(2019) would call an “external scaffold” of cultural evolution: a set of 
structural features that are, at the same time, the condition of possibility of 
cultural dynamics, and determine (although, of course, with a certain 
flexibility) the paths that societies are likely to follow once certain cultural 
variants spread. 
We are now ready to reconsider our original question: is a, so to speak, “evo-
demo” theory of cultural evolution Darwinian? The question is interesting 
because it has long been thought that the notions of population involved, 
respectively, in demographic and evolutionary studies were different and, to 
a large extent, incompatible (Kreager 2009). While Darwinian populations 
would be characterised by the variation between the members that make them 
up (in accordance with the interpretation of population thinking supported by 
Lewens and cultural epidemiologists), the notion of population at stake in 
demography—especially after the work of Alfred Lotka (1925)—would 
stress “typological” features of populations (such as fertility, mortality, etc.), 
shared by all of them. The two notions of population also differ because they 
suggest distinct conceptualisations of the environment in which a population 
is found. On the one hand, Darwinian populations are typically conceived as 
“open” populations, in the sense that they are sensitive to ecological 
influences, which can constitute selective pressure and, thus, change the 
composition of the population. Lotkean populations, on the other hand, would 
be “closed”, in the sense that the demographic factors are intended as 
sufficient for determining the changes that the population undergo through 
time. 
These differences between Darwinian and Lotkean populations—although 
perhaps methodologically relevant in some practices of, respectively, 
evolutionary biologists and demographers—are not, as far as I can see, an 
impediment to a fruitful synthesis between the two approaches. As a matter 
of fact, the basis for this synthesis was already laid, long time ago, by a 
fervent Darwinist, that is, Sewall Wright. 
The work of Wright is best understood in opposition to that of another 
Darwinian, Ronald Aylmer Fisher. Fisher first exposed his theoretical 
proposal about evolutionary processes in a series of papers between the 1910s 
and 1920s and later, more in detail, in The Genetical Theory of Natural 
Selection (1930). Fisher’s theory of evolution has been traditionally 
considered as a synthesis between the hitherto incompatible views of 
biometricians and Mendelians. In Fisher’s view, Biometricians were right in 
believing that phenotypic variation is continuous and that this fact requires 
an explanation, but they erroneously explained the transgenerational change 
	 
in the frequencies of phenotypic variants by postulating a mechanism of 
blending inheritance and massive mutations. On the other hand, Mendelians 
correctly believed that the units of inheritance—that is, of course, genes—
were discrete entities and that Mendelian inheritance was sufficient to 
guarantee the large amount of variability necessary to undertake the 
evolutionary processes, without postulating massive mutations. Nevertheless, 
they were wrong in underestimating the creative power of natural selection.5 
The challenge was thus, for Fisher, to explain how discrete entities like genes 
could generate continuous phenotypic variation and gradual evolutionary 
novelties. To this goal, he conceived allelic genes as individually responsible 
for very small phenotypic differences and selectable for any, even weak, 
adaptive benefit. Fisher conceived natural populations, at a certain 
generation, as arrays of alleles distributed along a multidimensional Gaussian 
curve, with the most common combinations in the middle. Ideally, an 
indefinitely large panmictic population where no evolutionary force is acting 
persists in this equilibrium. However, this is not what happens in the real 
world: in real populations, this equilibrium is constantly perturbed. Fisher 
considered that natural selection is the single most relevant cause of adaptive 
change in genetic frequencies. It constantly operates, in Fisher’s view, on 
every single locus—with completely addictive effect—by eliminating less fit 
genotypes, thus gradually increasing the average fitness of the population. 
This claim is expressed by Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem of Natural 
Selection, according to which “the rate of increase in the mean fitness of a 
population ascribable to gene-frequency changes is exactly equal to the 
additive genetic variance in fitness” (Edwards 2002, p. 335). 
Wright regarded at Fisher’s model as overly simplistic (Wright 1931). 
Following a typical Darwinian modus operandi (that is, the comparison 
between natural and artificial populations), he observed that when breeders 
try to select a single advantageous character in a large population (this 
technique is usually called “mass selection”), the consequences are frequently 
negative: “mass selection has a tendency to lower fitness in the population by 
turning up all sorts of unwanted gene combinations, normally hidden in 
heterozygotes, eventually inducing infertility” (Depew and Weber 1996, p. 
280). Even when this is not the case, the fixation of the selected trait is 
extremely slow. In Wright’s opinion, the effectiveness of mass selection is 
severely limited by the fact that genes usually do not phenotypically express 
themselves separately, but through complex networks of interactions, which 
are not necessarily genetically inheritable. A more effective way to select a 
trait would be to breed only those specimens whose networks of interactions 
are genetically transmissible as a whole. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to identify such specimens. In order to overcome 
this difficulty, “skilled breeders take the best specimens that can be produced 
by inbreeding and then outbreeding them with the best specimens of a 
	 
separate population” (Depew and Weber 1996, p. 280). The inbreeding phase 
favours the expression of a variety of inheritable interaction networks, thus 
allowing selection to act more efficiently. Wright guessed that something 
similar had to happen in nature as well. Consequently, he conceived the three-
step model known as shifting-balance model. According to it, species in 
nature are subdivided in relatively small inbreeding sub-populations, called 
demes. During a first phase, every deme, due to its reduced size, undergoes 
genetic drift. This process favours genetic recombination and increases 
selectable variation. Once inheritable interaction networks are made 
phenotypically visible, mass selection may act on the fittest variants, 
eventually raising the mean fitness of some demes (second step). Finally, 
interdemic selection, favoured by the interdemic migration of the 
most adapted individuals, raises global fitness (third step). In order to 
represent his model graphically, Wright conceived the famous diagram 
known as adaptive landscape (Wright 1932), depicting the evolutionary 
space as a complex array of valleys and hills, instead of a linear pathway to 
adaptation, as in Fisher’s conception. 
Through his shifting-balance model, Wright overcame a simplistic distinction 
between open and closed populations. Demes within a metapopulation, as 
well as the metapopulation itself, are open and closed at the same time, and 
both “openness” and “closedness” play a crucial role in population dynamics. 
It is precisely because demes are closed that they can undertake those 
processes (i.e. drift and recombination) that eventually permit intrademic 
selection to act. At the same time, demes need to be open to allow migration 
and interdemic selection to act. At a greater scale, the metapopulation is open 
insofar as, as a whole, it is subject to environmental conditions that influence 
its composition. Yet, in another sense, it is closed because its demic structure 
is a “typological” condition, which is necessary in order to produce 
the characteristic outcome of the shifting-balance process. 
Nowadays, most biologists consider that the shifting-balance model is, 
strictly speaking, flawed (Coyne et al. 1997). This is because the three phases 
of the shifting-balance process predicted by Wright have been rarely (if ever) 
observed. Nonetheless, this does not diminish the importance of Wright’s 
approach. Even though natural populations do not behave exactly like Wright 
thought, the consideration of the structural and demographic features of 
populations is, in many scenarios, crucial for correctly depicting evolutionary 
processes (Wade and Goodnight 1998; Wade 2016; see also Sect. 4.1 above). 
All this reinforces the impression that, in the context of cultural evolution, 
the debate about “how Darwinian” is cultural evolutionary theory has been 
artificially narrowed. First of all, it is not necessary that natural selection is 
ubiquitous for considering an evolutionary dynamic as Darwinian (see 
Bellon, Delisle; this volume). In Wrightian dynamics, selection is always 
accompanied by many other processes modulating the population change. 
	 
This is indeed something that the supporters of the selectionist approach 
acknowledge, but it has not been fully appreciated by Lewens and cultural 
epidemiologists in their criticisms. Both the selectionist and the populational 
interpretations, nonetheless, are limited to the extent that they focus almost 
exclusively on the putative resemblances (or differences) between genetic 
and cultural inheritance. The persistence of a relatively faithful channel of 
inheritance is, of course, a fundamental condition for the implementation of 
a Darwinian process. Nevertheless, there are other factors that can play an 
important role in directing evolutionary dynamics. 
As seen in Sect. 4, demographic factors are powerful causes of evolution. 
They sometimes simply favour some specific kinds of selective dynamics. 
However, in other cases, they create the conditions for more complex 
dynamics to occur. The demographic features of a population can drive the 
population towards certain specific compositions, in terms of cultural 





In this chapter, I have assessed some explanatory and methodological issues 
related to the possibility of considering the theory of cultural evolution as a 
Darwinian theory. First of all, in Sect. 2, I have presented a minimal 
characterisation of an evolutionary theory as a theory containing a set of 
transition laws and a dynamical characterisation of those laws (i.e. a causal 
description of the evolving system). The genetic theory of evolution is an 
evolutionary theory because it provides a set of transition laws describing the 
change of the allelic frequencies in a population, and it dynamically 
characterises this process by spelling out the mechanisms governing genetic 
inheritance and the possible ecological factors instantiating evolutionary 
forces. 
In the context of cultural evolutionary theory, there is a disagreement 
concerning whether it is possible to provide a causal characterisation of 
cultural change that is, to some extent, analogous to that of the genetic theory 
of evolution. In this debate, it is more or less implicitly assumed that it is 
depending on the similarities between genetic inheritance and cultural 
transmission that it is possible to qualify cultural evolutionary theory as a 
Darwinian theory (and cultural change as a Darwinian process). In Sect. 3, I 
have reviewed the three main positions in this debate, and I have concluded 
that the plausibility of two of them—that is, the selectionist and the 
populational interpretations—has to be assessed in light of empirical 
evidence. Still, I have also argued that the emphasis on the similarities or the 
	 
differences between genetic inheritance and cultural transmission has 
obscured other possible similarities between biological and cultural 
evolution. 
In Sect. 4, have stressed that demographic factors—understood as a set of 
factors related to the structure of populations—are calling attention of both 
evolutionary biologists and cultural evolutionists as an important cause of 
evolution. The point relevant for the debate concerning cultural evolution is 
that, even if we found out that cultural transmission is dissimilar to genetic 
inheritance in crucial aspects, this would not imply that we need to give up 
the idea that  cultural evolutionary theory is dynamically sufficient in a way 
that resembles evolutionary theory in biology. To address the concern that 
such a theory, although evolutionary, would not be Darwinian, I have argued 
in Sect. 5, that there is a long tradition in evolutionary biology that considers 
demographic factors as influential in evolutionary dynamics. This way of 
conceptualising evolutionary change, albeit perhaps not strictly speaking 
Darwinian, would be, at least, Wrigthean. 
In conclusion, regarding the role of selection in cultural evolution and the 
appropriateness of considering cultural change as a selective process, I would 
say that this should not be the focus of the discussion. Indirectly, the same 
may be said concerning the broader debate about the centrality of natural 
selection in biological evolutionary theory. Natural selection is certainly a 
fundamental process in evolution, and a fundamental process in the original 
Darwinian formulation of his theory. Nonetheless, theories change through 
time. In the case of biological evolutionary theory, the Modern Synthesis and, 
especially, the work of Sewall Wright showed that Darwinian theory is able 
to incorporate elements that were not included in the Darwinian formulation 
of the theory (as also emphasised by Esposito, this volume). Rather than 
discussing whether cultural evolutionary theory is a Darwinian theory 
because it properly mimics certain aspects of the genetic theory of evolution, 
we should be open to extend our analysis to other—perhaps sometimes 
considered as peripheral—aspects of evolutionary biology. 
In this sense, the parallel drawn in Sects. 4 and 5 between genetic and 
cultural evolution concerning the impact of demographic factors in evolution 
should not be just considered as an invitation to cultural evolutionists to seek 
the Darwinian origins of cultural evolutionary theory outside the debate over 
the similarities between genetic inheritance and cultural transmission. Also, 
it has the goal of stressing the ability of Darwinian theory of including topics 
and descriptions of evolutionary phenomena elaborated within other 
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1 To be precise, Lewontin introduces a third requirement to be satisfied by evolutionary theories, 
that is, empirical sufficiency. An evolutionary theory is empirically sufficient if scientists are 
able to measure the parameters that they introduce to formulate the laws of transformation. This 
is tantamount to say that the causal representation offered by an evolutionary theory should not 
be attainable just in principle, but also in practice. Lewontin is sceptical about the capacity of 
the genetic theory of evolution to fully satisfy this requirement. This is certainly a problem also 
for cultural evolutionary theory, but I shall not discuss it directly here. 
2 Notice that cultural selection does not necessarily favour genetically fittest variants. Since 
social learning is usually less costly or more effective than individual trial-and-error, partially 
maladaptive cultural variants (such as certain unhealthy eating habits) may be maintained within 
a population, evolve and even subvert “genetically-coded” behaviours. 
3 This is arguably the case of “purely statistical” theories (Matthen and Ariew 2002). 
4 This is indeed, according to some authors, the most common scenario in evolution (see, for a 
discussion of ideas related to this claim, Tattersall’s chapter in this volume). 
	 
5 For some more accurate remarks on the controversy between Mendelians and biometricians, 
and the origins of population genetics, see Adams’s chapter and Ochoa’s first contribution in this 
volume. 
 
